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PREFACE
This bibliography on credit guarantee schemes for agriculture and small, medium and
microenterprises has been prepared by the Department ofAgricultural Economics at The Ohio State
University, USA, in collaboration with the FAO Rural Finance Group in AGS. Its objective is to
disseminate information to development agencies, policy makers and researchers. The publications
for this bibliography were collected by Richard L. Meyer and Geetha Nagarajan and abstracts were
prepared by Geetha Nagaraj an at The Ohio State University. The majority of the articles cited are
to be found at the ACTS library collection at The Ohio State University.
The most important criteria used in the selection ofdocuments for the bibliography was that
they covered credit guarantee schemes initiated by donors and governments to promote agriculture,
small, medium and microenterprises and that they include various geographical regions.
We are very much appreciative of the financial assistance received from FAO in preparing
this manuscript. Special thanks to Richard Roberts, Pekka Hussi and Ake Olaffson of FAO, and to
J.D. Von Pischke in locating materials for the bibliography. We also acknowledge the secretarial
assistance provided by Lori Karn, Ohio State.
The present bibliography follows the layout ofprevious bibliographies. Requests for copies
of this bibliography and information regarding publications listed should be addressed to:
Agricultural Finance Program
Dept. of Agricultural Economics
The Ohio State University
2120 Fyffe Road
Columbus, Ohio 43210
USA
Tel: 614-292-8014
Fax: 614-292-7362
For any request, a fee ofUS$ 0.15 per page will be charged to cover copying and mailing.
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3Annotated Bibliography on Credit Guarantee Schemes for Agriculture
and Small, Medium and Microenterprises
1. ACCION International, "A Decade of Guaranteeing Success," ACCION International
Bulletin, Vol. 30, No.1, Winter 1995, pp. 1-3.
The design of the ACCION guarantee scheme is described in this report. It guarantees bank
loans made to well performing ACCION affiliates in Latin America to lend to small and
microenterprises. The composition of that guarantee fund and the mechanism of leveraging
it through banks are discussed and placement of the ACCION guarantees in several Latin
American countries is outlined.
Key: ACCION International, Small and microenterprises, Leverage, Latin America.
2. Asociacion LatinAmericana de Entidades de Garantia, "Boletin de Prensa," Colombia:
ALEG, 1995, (Spanish).
The objectives and framework for the Latin American Association of Guarantee Institutions
(ALEG) are described in this paper. The objectives of ALEG includes creation of guarantee
mechanisms to increase loans to SMEs. The association will be able to provide information
about all the Latin American guarantee systems in operation to service SMEs, and will lobby
for mobilizing a common guarantee fund for Latin America. [7400]
Key: Latin America, SMEs, Guarantee Funds.
3. Acociation Europea de Caucion Mutua, "European Mutual Guarantee Corporation," Madrid:
Acociation Europea de Caucion Mutua, 1995, 14 p.
This brochure describes the objectives, components, organizational structure and participants
ofthe European Mutual Guarantee Association that represents national societies in European
Union and operates within the mutual guarantee framework to promote small and medium
enterprises. [7418]
Key: European Union, Mutual Guarantee Association, Small and medium enterprises.
4. Acociation Europea de Caucion Mutua, "Analisis Comparativo de las Sociedades de Caucion
Mutua en Europa," Madrid: Acociation Europea de Caucion Mutua, June 1994, 18 p,
(Spanish).
4The origin, evolution, characteristics and organizational structure ofmutual credit guarantee
associations and how they relate to existing institutional and political structures are discussed
in this report. The performance of mutual credit guarantee associations in Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain are discussed in detail. Programs proposed for Portugal, Ireland,
Greece and Hungary are also described. [7369]
Key: Mutual credit guarantee associations, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Hungary.
5. Agricultural Credit Policy Council, The Cooperative Guarantee and Loan Fund, Manila:
ACPC, Proposed Program for Lending to the Poor through Cooperatives, Nov. 1987, 4p.
Presents a proposal to create the "Cooperative Guarantee" aimed at encouraging the lending
by banks to cooperatives through a combined loan and guarantee scheme. The scheme will
be based on an equal sharing of project financing requirements among the cooperative, the
bank and the government.
Key: The Philippines, Cooperative guarantee.
6. Ajayi, G.A., O.L. Oludimu and S.A. Oni, "A Financial Appraisal of the Nigerian
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund," International Journal of Development
Bankin~, Vol. 4, No.2, July 1986, pp. 13-20.
A financial appraisal of the Nigerian Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme and its ability
to reach small farmers is presented in this paper. An evaluation of the program during the
period of 1977-80 shows that the program has not benefitted small farmers. Channelling
guaranteed loans through cooperatives, expanding the target sector to fisheries and increasing
loan interest rates are recommended. [4999]
Key: Nigeria, Agriculture, Cooperatives, Government guarantee.
7. Aku, P.S., "Problems in Financing Agriculture through Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Scheme Fund (ACGSF) in Kaduma State, Nigeria," A~ricultural Administration, Vol. 12,
1983, pp. 21-26.
The paper examines the performance of the agricultural credit guarantee scheme
implemented by the government ofNigeria to increase lending to small farmers. The results
of the study, based on a survey of 42 fanners who participated in the scheme in 1980,
5indicate that the scheme has not increased loans to the target sector but has benefitted larger
rather than small farmers.
Key: Nigeria, Agriculture, Government Guarantee.
8. Aku, P.S, "Lending to Farmers through the Commercial Banks in a Developing Economy:
The Nigerian Experience," A~ricultural Systems, Vol. 22, 1986, pp. 23-32.
An evaluation of the Nigerian experience in commercial bank lending to the agricultural
sector using an agricultural credit guarantee scheme is examined in this paper. The
guaranteed loans were concentrated in the large farmer portfolio and were not uniformly
distributed among the different states. The author suggests the introduction of cooperative
societies to increase lending to small farmers. [7371]
Key: Government Guarantees, Agriculture, Nigeria..
9. Apatini, Klara, "Forderung von klein-und mittelstandischen Unternehmen mit
Krefditgarantie in Ungarn," Hamburg: Europaischer Kongress der Burgschaftbanken held
in October 4-6, 1993, 2 p, (German).
The loan guarantee program in Hungary is described in this paper. It guarantees up to a
maximum of 80 percent of loan principal losses incurred by commercial banks.
Key: Credit guarantee, Hungary.
10. Balkenhol, Bernd, "Guaranteeing Bank Loans to Smaller Entrepreneurs in West Africa,"
International Labor Review, Vol. 129, No.2, 1990, pp. 245-253.
The paper examines the reasons for the failure of several traditional guarantee programs
implemented in francophone West African countries including Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Senegal
and Burkina Faso. Inadequate commercial bank participation, high dependence on
government funding, and excessive bureaucracy that caused delays in assessing and settling
claims led to the failure of the programs. Mutual guarantee associations that counter
guarantee loans made to their members are suggested for this region. However, the failure
of credit guarantee associations in Senegal suggests that bank regulations that currently
restrict banks from working with mutual credit associations need to be changed for effective
functioning of such guarantees. [4280]
Key: Credit Guarantee Schemes, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Iviore, Mutual
Credit Guarantee Associations.
611. Bautista, Emesto D., "Financing Agriculture: The Relevance of Credit Risk Guarantee
Schemes," Manila: Agricultural Credit Policy Council, Department of Agriculture, Staff
Paper 89-05, November 1989, 11 p.
The author examines the role of credit guarantees in a framework that highlights the nature
and operation of agriculture and of rural credit markets. The conceptual model treats credit
guarantee analogous to collateral and shows additionality in quantity of loans supplied due
to guarantees. It also shows that guarantee mechanisms impose less distortionary effects on
the financial markets compared to direct interventions. The accumulated evidence from the
Philippine Guarantee programs, however, suggests an inability of the programs to induce
increased bank lending to the targeted sector. [0296]
Key: The Philippines, Government guarantee, Collateral, Additionality, Agriculture.
12. Bautista, Emesto D., "Operation of Agricultural Risk Guarantee Schemes: The Philippine
Experience, Manila: " Agricultural Credit Policy Council, 1991, 66 p.
This paper examines the Philippine experience with government agricultural credit guarantee
schemes. Concludes that while costs are lower than for targeted credit, the benefits realized
are limited. Furthermore, the beneficiaries were typically well-capitalized borrowers who
would likely have had access to credit even without guarantees. Argues that guarantee
programs should operate on a cost covering basis, and that interest rate subsidies should be
phased out. Suggests a move to deficiency guarantee, covering only actual losses rather than
the full loan amount. [5422]
Key: Government guarantees, the Philippines, Cost coverage, Subsidies, Agriculture.
13. Berger, Marguerite and Mayra Buvinic, eds., "The Credit Guarantee Mechanisms for
Improving Women's Access to Bank Loans," in Women's Ventures: Assistance to the
Informal Sector in Latin America, Connecticut: Kumarian Press Inc, 1989, pp. 174- 184.
The authors describe the guarantee mechanism designed by the Women's World Banking
to improve womens' access to bank loans. A review of performance of Women's World
Banking affiliates in Dominican Republic and Haiti shows that the program has increased
access to bank loans for SMEs operated by women. The paper also provides guidelines for
establishing and operating as a Women's World Banking affiliate. [7394]
Key: Women's World Banking Guarantee program, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Small
and microenterprises.
714. Bonsu, Ohene Kwaku, "Enterprise Credit in West Africa: Transforming Credit Finance
Schemes in Donor Funded Projects into Quasi-Formal Institutions for MSE Financial
Intermediation: The Case of CERIDEP in Ghana," Ghana: University of Ghana, Legon,
April 1995, 29 p.
This paper assesses the ability of donor funded credit finance schemes in Ghana to provide
an alternative sustainable source of financing to small and microenterprises. The operation
of the Central Region Integrated Development Programme (CERIDEP) funded by UNDP
to provide loans for working capital, hire purchases, and loan guarantees for long-term loans
is discussed in detail. CERIDEP guarantees 60 percent of the losses on loans made to small
and microenterprises for long-term investments. The unit cost ofoperation has been high due
to the limited number of enterprises covered by the program and the high cost is expected
to erode the capital base and lead to unsustainability. It is recommended that CERIDEP
operate on sound financial discipline to recapitalize its funds for a sustainable operation.
[7405]
Key: Ghana, UNDP Guarantee, Transaction costs, Sustainability.
15. Boocock, Grahame and Mohammed Noor Mohammed Sharif, "Loan Guarantee Schemes for
SMEs - the Experience of Malaysia," Small Enterprise Development, Vol. 7, No.2, June
1996, pp. 25-35.
The Malaysian Credit Guarantee Corporation is evaluated based on interviews with the
guaranteed SMEs and their bankers. The effectiveness ofthe guarantee scheme in improving
relationships with banks and SMEs, and in increasing financial and economic additionality
have been limited. The paper concludes with some implications of the scheme's experience
for other developing countries. [7344]
Key: Additionality, Malaysia, Guarantee coverage, SMEs.
16. Bosworth, Barry P., Andrew S. Carron and Elizabeth H. Rhyne, The Economics of Federal
Credit Programs, Washington, D.C., : The Brookings Institution, 1987, 178 p.
Several government assisted credit programs including the loan guarantee program in the
United States of America are evaluated based on the subsidy cost of the programs. Loan
insurance and credit guarantee programs implemented by the Small Business Administration
are evaluated in detail. The federal credit programs are found to have minimal impact on the
allocation of resources in agriculture and small business sectors where the subsidy has been
very large.
8Key: USA, Small Business Administration, Subsidy costs, Government guarantee,
Impact.
17. Castellanos, Jorge, "Design and Supervision of Loan Guarantee Organizations," Paper
Presented at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and
Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank,
Washington, D.C., June 27-28, 1996, 23 p.
The implications of granting formal financial institution status to loan guarantors of SME
lending is analyzed in this paper. The issues of supervision are discussed. A basic guarantee
program under a supervisory regime that insists on capital adequacy, loan loss provisioning,
debtor reporting system, unified ledger and reserve management policy is recommended.
[7350]
Key: Supervision, Capital adequacy, Loan loss provision, Debtor reporting, Reserve
management.
18. Central Bank ofNigeria, National Agricultural Credit Study ofNi~eria, Report of the Study
Team, vol. 1, 1986, 245p. and vol. 2, 1986, 864 p.
These reports contain a detailed analysis of the activities and problems of various agencies
which are engaged in the supply of agricultural credit in Nigeria. These agencies include the
banking system, non-bank government-sponsored agencies, agricultural loan guarantee
funds, the cooperative credit system, and the non-institutional credit agencies such as pre-
cooperatives and moneylenders. Also examines the status of technical support services
available for agricultural credit and analyzes the demand side for credit on the basis of a
countrywide farm-level survey carried out as part of the study.
Key: Nigeria, Agricultural Loan Guarantee Scheme, Government guarantee,
Agriculture.
19. Central Bank of Swaziland, "Highlights of Development Finance Division Schemes: Export
Finance Credit Guarantee Scheme and Small Scale Loan Guarantee Scheme," Mbabane:
Central Bank of Swaziland, August 1994, 5 p.
The volume of guarantees outstanding and premium incomes, total income and expenses,
defaults and claims paid by the export finance credit guarantee scheme and small scale loan
guarantee scheme started by the government of Swaziland in 1990 are reported in this
document.
9Key: Swaziland, Export finance credit guarantee scheme, Small scale loan guarantee
scheme, Government guarantee.
20. Chan, Flerida C., "The Barrio Savings Fund and The Barrio Guarantee Fund: A Status
Report," Manila: Agricultural Credit Policy Council, Staffpaper 90-01, February 1990,9 p.
This report reviews the status of the barrio guarantee fund created as a forced savings
mechanism for farmers associations in the Philippines. The barrio guarantee fund guarantees
the payment of land amortization of the members of the association. Although the fund is
large and owned by the farmers' association, it has been difficult to withdraw the funds due
to rigid procedures. It is suggested that guidelines for fund withdrawal be reviewed and that
the fund be gradually converted into a regular guarantee fund to improve commercial bank
lending to agrarian reform beneficiaries. [0297]
Key: Barrio guarantee funds, Farmers association, The Philippines, Agriculture.
21. Chaney, Paul K. and Anjan V. Thakor, "Incentive Effects of Benevolent Intervention: The
Case of Government Loan Guarantees," Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 26, 1985, pp.
169-189.
This paper analyzes the potential incentive effects of government loan guarantees on the
borrower's debt-equity ratio and types of projects chosen in anticipation of a guarantee.
Dsing a two period model, the paper shows that when firms know that government loan
guarantees are available, they engage in riskier activities and take on more leverage. This
firm behavior will increase the loan guarantee related contingent liabilities of the govern-
ment. It is recommended that the government abandon the program or encourage a federal
agency to sell loan guarantees to all firms at prices commensurate with the riskiness of the
firm's assets and leverage.
Key: Government guarantee, Incentive effect.
22. Cheryl, DeVuyst, S. and David A. Lins, "Empirical Analysis of a State Guarantee Program
for Restructuring Agricultural Debt," Urbana: Department of Agricultural Economics,
University of Illinois, January 1995,12 p.
The State Guarantee program for restructuring agricultural loans through the Illinois Farm
Development Authority is examined. The analysis was based on 423 loans guaranteed during
1986-87. While other economic changes were expected to affect the financial positions of
the borrowers, it was found that some borrowers were able to benefit from the guarantee
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program. The study, however, could not provide any solid recommendation as to whether or
not to continue or terminate the program. [7404]
Key: USA, Government guarantee, Agriculture.
23. Croatian Guarantee Agency, "General Information about the Croatian Guarantee Agency,"
Zagreb: Croatian Guarantee Agency, 1995, 14 p.
The organizational structure and design of the proposed Croatian Guarantee Agency to
guarantee loans made to small and medium scale enterprises is described in this document.
The agency intends to provide guarantees and financial subsidies to banks and savings banks
to reduce costs of loans issued to small and medium scale enterprises. [7374]
Key: Government guarantee, Croatia, Small and medium enterprises.
24. Epstein, Jose and Fred Graham, "The Role of Collateral in Small Business Lending,"
Washington, D.C.: USAID, Investment Development and Packaging Project Number 940-
2002, June 1991,57 p.
The authors show that credit guarantee schemes have not been successful in eliminating the
collateral requirements for small borrowers. However, on average, the collateral to loan
ratios are lower for loans made with guarantees compared to ones made without guarantees.
The success of guarantee programs like FUNDES, SBDC in South Africa are attributed to
their moderate risk sharing, low transaction costs and credibility of the guarantor. A full
examination of the borrowers obtaining loans under the guarantee program compared to
those who would have received them without the program is recommended. [7490]
Key: Collateral, FUNDES guarantee, Latin America, South Africa, Transaction costs,
Small businesses.
25. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "Model Law on Secured
Transactions," London: EBRD, 1994, 64 p.
A legal system for secured transactions in market economies in transition in Europe is
detailed in this report. The rights to property, securing business credits, secured debt, and
rights to enforce contracts using securities are discussed in detail and practical guidelines are
issued. The model laws are recommended to be used as models to perfect secured
transactions including credit guarantees in Europe. [7382]
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Key: Legal framework, Secured transaction, Market economies in transition, Europe,
Enforcing contracts.
26. European Commission PHARE Programme, "The Newly Founded Guarantee Institutions
for SMEs in Central and Eastern Europe," Vienna: European Commission PHARE
Programme, BURGES Forderungsbank, March 1994,45 p.
A survey of newly implemented guarantee programs to promote small and medium
enterprises in Slovak Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Hungary is provided
in this report. The survey includes details such as description of the organization, design of
the guarantee institution, guarantee coverage and fee, number and amount of guarantees
issued, and number and amount of claims made. [7386]
Key: Slovak Republic, Romania, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Guarantee
Schemes, Small and medium enterprises.
27. FAO/ALIDE, "EI Papel de las Garantias en los Prestamos Agrarios: Fondo Agropecuario de
Garantias, Colombia," Rome: FAO, February, 1995, 38 p, (Spanish).
The objectives, operational procedures and evaluation of the guarantee program established
by the government ofColombia to increase bank loans to the agricultural sector are described
in this paper. [7489]
Key: Government guarantee, Colombia, Agriculture.
28. FAOIALIDE, "EI Papel de las Garantias en los Prestamos Agrarios: Fondos de Garantia,
Mexico," Rome: FAO, February, 1995,82 p, (Spanish).
The guarantee fund established in Mexico to increase access to bank loans for the
agricultural sector is described in this paper. The objectives, operational methods of the
guarantee fund and results ofan evaluation ofthe program are provided. A detailed appendix
elaborates on the legal procedures involved in operating the program. [7487]
Key: Government guarantee, Mexico, Agriculture.
29. FAOIALIDE, "EI Papel de las Garantias en los Prestamos Agrarios: Fondo de Garantia para
Pequenos Empresarios, EI Salvador," Rome: FAO, February, 1995, 38 p, (Spanish).
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This paper describes the principal characteristics and operational methods of the guarantee
fund established in EI Salvador to increase access by microentrepreneurs to bank loans. A
brief evaluation of the program is also presented. [7488]
Key: Government guarantee, EI Salvador, Microenterprises, Evaluation.
30. Feder, Gershon, Tongroj Onchan & Tejaswi Raparla, CollateraL Guaranties and Rural Credit
in Developin~ Countries, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, June 1987, 28 p.
This paper presents evidence from several less developed countries on the use of individual
and group guarantees as collateral in rural financial markets. [0018]
Key: Collateral, Individual guarantee, Group guarantee, Less developed countries.
31. FUNDES, "Concepto de un Sistema de Garantia para la Micro y Pequena Empresa en Costa
Rica," Switzerland: FUNDES, Internal Document, February 1995, (Spanish).
This is a proposal to create a national guarantee fund as a second tier institution in Costa
Rica under the supervision of the central bank. The national guarantee fund will guarantee
several private guarantee funds that will guarantee bank loans made to SMEs. The proposal
presents several operational guidelines for the guarantee fund. [7398]
Key: Guarantee fund, Costa Rica, SMEs.
32. Garcia, Por Beatriz Marulanda de, "Fondo Nacional de Garantias de Colombia," Paper
Presented at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and
Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank,
Washington, D.C., June 27-28,1996,32 p, (Spanish).
The evolution and current status of the public guarantee program in Colombia, Fonda
Nacional de Garantias, is described in this paper. The program has undergone several
changes since its inception in 1982. Currently, the program follows a global approach,
shares risks with the banks and charges according to guarantee coverage. The author
concludes that the impact of the program has been minimal and banks are not very
enthusiastic in participating in the program. [7484]
Key: Credit Guarantee, Colombia, Global approach, Fees, Guarantee coverage.
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33. Geis, Heinz-Gunter, "Kreditgarantiefonds in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit," Berlin:
Institut fur Bank-und Finanzwirtschaft, Freie Universitat, Working paper No. 15, February
1993, 92 p, (German).
Definition, functions and types of credit guarantee schemes, and relevant institutional
arrangements and financial technologies necessary for implementing credit guarantee pro-
grams are discussed in this monograph. Experiences ofthe guarantee companies in Germany
and their replication in developing countries are also provided. The appendix includes several
published papers on credit guarantee schemes in developing countries. .[7384]
Key: Germany, German guarantee schemes.
34. Ghatpande, S.M., "The Role of the (Nigerian) Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund
in Agricultural Finance," Indian Journal of A~riculturalEconomics, Vol. 39, No.2, 1984,
pp. 259-268.
The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund, established in Nigeria in 1977 with the
intention of encouraging banks to undertake the risk of financing agriculture by assuring
them of repayment in the event of a default on the part of the farmer is assessed. The paper
first discusses the main provisions of the ACG Scheme Fund Decree and then makes a
critical appraisal of the scheme. It concludes that the role of the ACG Scheme Fund in
agricultural finance is not likely to be a dominant one, at least for some time. [5388]
Key: Nigeria, Agriculture, Government guarantee.
35. Graham Bannock and Partners Ltd., "Securitization of Guaranteed SME loans in Europe and
Finance for Innovation," London: Graham Bannock and Partners Ltd, Study prepared for the
European Innovation Monitoring System, January 1995,116 p.
The paper investigates the scope for using securitization to promote bank lending to SMEs
based on experiences from the United States and the European Union. The guarantee
mechanisms found in Europe are also discussed. The quality of guarantee coverage and the
homogeneity of loan transactions are recommended as necessary conditions to obtain
investment grade credit rating in the securities market. [7356]
Key: Securitization, United States, Europe, Guarantee coverage, Homogeneity, SMEs.
36. Graham, Douglas H., Richard L. Meyer and Carlos E. Cuevas, eds., "Financial Markets in
The Gambia, 1981-1991," Columbus: Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural
14
Sociology, The Ohio State University, Report submitted to the USAID/The Gambia, January
1993, pp 54-55.
The automatic government guarantee ofup to 80 percent ofthe losses on loans made to small
and microenterprises by Indigenous Business Advisory Service (IBAS) and the Gambia
Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) in The Gambia is outlined. It was found that
the claims made to collect indemnities for defaulted loans were never honored. Currently,
the Gambian government has discontinued issuing guarantees and has signed commitments
with donors not to sponsor any guarantee programs. [5932]
Key: The Gambia, Small and microenterprises, Government guarantee.
37. Gudger, Michael, "The Development ofa Self-Sustaining Credit Guarantee Facility for Rural
Sector Finance," Kampala: Bank of Uganda, Consulting Report, May 1'995, 38 p.
The legislation and operation of the existing government credit guarantee scheme in Uganda
is reviewed to design a viable guarantee fund for the cotton subsector. The legislation was
assessed to be restrictive to facilitate the operation of the guarantee scheme and the cotton
subsector was too small to support a viable guarantee operation. A credit guarantee company
that serves the entire Ugandan economy to generate premiums to cover for administration
costs and losses and reach economies of scale is recommended. [7370]
Key: Uganda, Agriculture, Credit Guarantee Company, Government guarantee, Fund
viability.
38. Gudger, Michael, "Case Studies in Crop Insurance and Credit Guarantee Funds,"
Washington, D.C.: Consultancy Report Prepared for the World Bank, 1991. 98 p.
Case studies from Mexico, The Philippines, USA and Nigeria covering their crop insurance
and credit guarantee programs are presented in this report. While the share of loans that are
guaranteed compared to total loans made to the agricultural sector is large in Mexico, it is
insignificant in Nigeria. The Mexican program is highly subsidized by the government. The
paper concludes that neither empirical nor theoretical justification exists for guaranteed
programs to have a positive effect on the volume of loans made to the agricultural sector
without substantial subsidization.
Key: Crop insurance, Government guarantee, Mexico, The Philippines, USA, Nigeria,
Subsidization, Agriculture.
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39. Gudger, Michael, "Sustainability of Credit Guarantee Systems," Paper Presented at the
Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for Latin
America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-
28,1996.
The issue of sustainability of guarantee programs is discussed by examining the costs of
making and guaranteeing small loans, and the ways in which these costs are affected by
different levels of guarantee coverage. A program is considered sustainable only when it
does not require subsidies from government or donors. A case study of the Caja Social in
Columbia is provided. The paper concludes that programs that provide wholesale guarantees
in favor of the lenders of the lender may be sustainable if such guarantees enable the lender
to finance itself from the funds and avoid mobilizing high cost deposits from the public.
[7349]
Key: Sustainability, Columbia, Subsidy, Wholesale guarantee, Costs of guarantees.
40. Guzman, Maria Margarita and Maria Clemencia Castro, "From a Women's Guarantee Fund
to a Bank for Microenterprise: Process and Results," Women's Ventures: Assistance to the
Informal Sector in Latin America, Berger, Marguerite and Mayra Buvinic, eds., Connecticut:
Kumarian Press Inc, 1989, pp. 185-200.
The transformation of the Banco Mundial de la Mujer in Cali, Colombia from a guarantee
facility to a bank for microentrepreneurs is described in this paper. While male borrowers
increased sales and employment, women borrowers increased their net income and standard
of living. Combining guarantee and banking services was found to be efficient.
Diversification of credit lines for the borrowers along a fixed asset line, home improvement
line and a general line of credit was recommended. [4034]
Key: Guarantee facility, Colombia, Microentrepreneurs.
41. Hatakeyama, Michiko S., "Asian Credit Guarantee Systems for Small and Medium
Enterprises," Paper Presented at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International
Experiences and Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development
Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-28,1996,28 p.
The details of credit guarantee program designs in Japan, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia are
provided in this paper. The number of guarantees, costs ofproviding guarantees, and default
rates are discussed for the four countries. A brief comparison of the schemes shows that
while the Japanese and Korean schemes involve lower costs and generate low but secured
profits to the guarantor, the programs in Indonesia and Malaysia are high cost and are
provided to high risk SMEs that generate low profits. [7347]
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Key: Malaysia, Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Guarantee design, Costs of guarantees, SMEs.
42. Herr, William, "Toward an Analysis of the Farmers Home Administration's Direct and
Guaranteed Farm Loan Programs," Washington, D.C.: United States Department of
Agriculture, AGES 9116, April 1991, 33 p.
This paper examines how the shift from direct lending to guaranteed lending by the Farm
Home Administration has affected the farm sector and farm credit markets. Guaranteed
lending is shown to facilitate additional lending under the conditions of program efficiency.
It was found that guaranteed program is cost effective compared to direct lending but a com-
plete shift to guaranteed lending would exclude low-income, low-risk borrowers. The author
recommends developing a secondary market to enable lenders to increase their returns and
decreasing guarantee level as risk increases to reduce bias towards low risk borrowers.
[7375]
Key: Agriculture, Government guarantee, Additionality, Secondary market, USA.
43. Holden, Paul, "A Description and Analysis of the FUNDES Guarantee Scheme for Lending
to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises," Switzerland: FUNDES, 1995, lOp.
The operational methodology using a selective guarantee of individual loans and
performance of the FUNDES guarantee scheme for increasing bank lending to small and
medium sized enterprises in Latin America is discussed in this paper. The guarantee schemes
are found to have made minimal impact in expanding bank lending to the target sector. The
author suggests a shift to a global approach of guaranteeing a portfolio to reduce transaction
costs and increase the number ofclients. Features ofthe proposed global guarantee approach
are outlined. [7378]
Key: FUNDES guarantee, Small and medium enterprises, Latin America, Selective
approach, Global approach, Transaction costs.
44. Holden, Paul, "Collateral Without Consequence: The Causes and Effects of Financial
Development in Latin America," Paper Presented at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee
Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-
American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-28,1996,23 p.
The consequences of lack of access to financial markets by SMEs and the issues of secured
transactions that can improve SME access to bank finance are discussed. SME access to bank
finance is low in Latin America compared to Singapore, Thailand, Germany and the United
States. The low access to bank finance is reported to slow the growth of SMEs in Latin
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America. It is concluded that credit guarantee programs are not a substitute for financial
market reforms but have the potential to speed up the reform process. [7353]
Key: Latin America, Singapore, USA, Germany, Thailand, SMEs, Loan access, SME
growth, Secured transactions, Financial reform, Guarantee programs.
45. Hunter, William, "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and SBA Business Loan Guarantees,"
Congressional Budget Office, The Congress of the United States: Proceedings of the
Conference on the Economics of Federal Credit Activity: Part 11,1982, pp. 235-280.
The implications of moral hazard and adverse selection for the efficient functioning of the
Small Business Authority (SBA) ofthe U.S guaranteed lending are examined in this paper.
The theoretical model shows that as guarantee level increases, the incentives for exercising
care above the simple protection level by the banks decreases. Empirical results based on 400
SBA loans confirmed the theoretical predictions that higher guarantee coverage reduces bank
care and results in higher defaults. The results indicate the existence of moral hazard. A
lower guarantee coverage and a guarantee fee that is directly related to bank behavior that
affects the probability of default is suggested. [7412]
Key: USA, Small business, Moral hazard, Adverse selection, Government guarantee,
Guarantee coverage and fees.
46. Inter-American Development Bank, "Notes Regarding the Guarantee Project in Colombia,"
Washington, D.C.,: Inter-American Development Bank, Internal Document, 1995, 44 p.
This is a summary of a program initiated by the Inter-American Development bank to
strengthen the guarantee system for small and microenterprises in Colombia. The
recommendations include the continuation of the legal and regulatory framework of the
guarantee scheme.
Key: Colombia, SMEs, IDB, Legal framework, Regulatory framework.
47. Interdisziplinare Projekt Consult GmbH, "Trinidad and Tobago: Global Credit Program for
Microenterprises," Frankfurt: Interdisziplinaire Projekt Consult Gmbh, 1992, 68 p.
The Small Business Development Company set up by the Ministry of Finance in Trinidad
and Tobago to offer loan guarantees and technical assistance to microenterprises is examined
in this paper. It was found that the default rates are high and the guarantee facility is unviable
since costs and claims exceed revenues. The inefficient incentive structures made the
guarantee facility vulnerable to exploitation by both the clients whose loans it guarantees and
banks who use its services. The demand for guaranteed loans is low and the marginal impact
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of the guarantee is minimal. It is suggested that loan guarantee programs cannot be
economically justified in Trinidad and Tobago. [7397]
Key: Government guarantee, Microenterprises, Trinidad and Tobago, Impact,
Incentive structure.
48. IPC, "Peru: Analisis de los Fondos de Garantia de Creditos y Perspectivas del Uso de Dicho
Esquema par Promovar la Incorporacion de la Pequena Empresa como Sujeto de Credito del
Sistema Financiero," Florida: Interdisciplinary Project Consulting Inc., Internal Document,
1995. (Spanish)
This paper examines the feasibility of a guarantee fund to increase bank lending to SMEs in
Peru. Based on empirical evidence, it concludes that guarantee schemes increase costs of
borrowing and have limited influence in increasing bank lending to the target sector. It
recommends that the banks should invest in learning lending skills in servicing SMEs rather
than depend on guarantee schemes. [7399]
Key: Peru, Guarantee funds, SMEs, Lending technology, Costs of borrowing.
49. Kalbus, Jeffrey H. Warren F. Lee and Gary D. Schnitkey, "Credit Subsidies and Transaction
Costs ofTwo Government Credit Programs in Ohio," Columbus: Department ofAgricultural
Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, January 1995, 26 p.
The study examines credit subsidies and lenders' transaction costs for Ohio's Linked Deposit
Program and Farmer's Home Administration's Guaranteed Loan Program. It is found that
the largest of credit subsidies for the guarantee program originates from its default risk costs
and that lenders incur high transaction costs although they receive up to 90 percent protection
against loan losses. Administrative fees collected for issuing loan guarantees only partially
offset the guarantor's operating costs. Simple procedures for using guarantees and technical
assistance to lenders are recommended. [7383]
Key: Government credit programs, Government guarantee, Credit subsidies,
Transaction costs, Default risk costs, USA, Agriculture.
50. Kaufman, Herbert M., "Loan Guarantees and Crowding Out," Congressional Budget Office,
The Congress of the United States: Proceedings of the Conference on the Economics of
Federal Credit Activity: Part 11,1982, pp. 67-110.
The paper, based on simple supply of and demand for securities, develops a framework for
analyzing the impact of federal guarantees on financial markets and the allocation of
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resources in the economy. Guarantees are shown to crowd out nonguaranteed projects that
would be financed if guarantees were not available, and to put upward pressure on interest
rates and receive preference in financing because oftheir status as a guaranteed security. The
level of private financing is shown to be larger in the absence of guarantees. [7410]
Key: Impact, Crowding out, Government guarantee.
51. Kim, Yoon Ok, "Korea's Small Business Finance Guarantee System: An Overview," Paper
Presented at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and
Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank,
Washington, D.C., June 27-28, 1996, 11 p.
An overview of the Small Business Finance Guarantee system operated by the government
of Korea to enable access of SMEs to bank finance is provided in this paper. A brief
summary of volume and number of guarantees issued, costs, revenues and indemnities over
the period of three decades is also reported. [7346]
Key: Korea, SMEs, Guarantees, Costs, Revenues, Indemnities.
52. Kommision der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, "Die Bedeutung Der Kreditgarantiegemein-
schaften Fur Die Finanzierung Kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen in der Europaischen
Gemeinschaft" Brussel: Kommision der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, September 1991, 26
p, (German).
This report summarizes the problems facing credit guarantee companies of the European
community in servicing small and middle sized enterprises. Organization structure, the role
of credit guarantee companies in the community and their relationship with banks are
discussed. Creation of a European United Credit Guarantee Company and dissemination of
information through conferences and seminars across the European Union are recommended.
[7363]
Key: Credit guarantee companies, European Union, Small and medium enterprises.
53. Kongsiri, Aswin, "Nepal: A Report on the Credit Guarantee System," Washington, D.C.,:
The World Bank, May 1986,41 p.
The Credit Guarantee Corporation (CaC) established by the government in 1974 and
restructured in 1981 to automatically guarantee up to 75 percent of all priority sector lending
by the two commercial banks in Nepal is examined in this paper. Although the capital fund
has increased over the years, it has been found to be ineffective in inducing bank lending to
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the priority sector. The paper suggests that CGC is the most appropriate institution to provide
guarantees but it recommends restructuring of its organization for cost effectiveness. It is
recommended that the premium rate be increased to 2 percent per annum from the current
1 percent, that a comprehensive review of its operations, and that training of the staff to
improve loan screening and supervision skills be conducted. A self-insurance scheme within
commercial banks through a reserve fund created using the premiums paid to the CGC to
cover loan losses is also recommended. [7406]
Key: Priority sector, Nepal, Government guarantee, Self-insurance scheme.
54. Krahnen, Jan Pieter and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Development Finance as Institution Building:
A New Approach to Poverty-Oriented Banking, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994,
154 p.
A credit guarantee program is considered as an insurance company that covers the risks of
the banks whose customers default on their obligations. It is argued that guarantee programs
can help small enterprises only when banks like to work with the targeted clients but lack
experience and information, and when the local banking system is ineffective. Otherwise,
the authors suggest that guarantee programs are very expensive and are ineffective
mechanisms to service small and microenterprises.
Key: Insurance, Small and microenterprises.
55. Lack, Steve., "PED Credit Guarantee Facilities: Start-up, Operations, Interface,"
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Private Enterprise, Financial Market Project, USAID, July
1988,58 p.
Guidelines for implementation of a local currency credit guarantee fund in Guatemala is
presented in this report. Project design and suggestions for promoting banks' interest in
utilization of the guarantee facility to make loans to private enterprises are discussed.
Recommendations include collection of data on transaction costs and benefits at lender and
borrower levels, and on credit demand. [7392]
Key: Guatemala, USAID Guarantee, Local currency, Private enterprises.
56. Lack, Steve, "Development of Administrative and Control Procedures for a Local Currency
Loan Guarantee Mechanism for Small and Medium Enterprises," Washington, D.C.:
Prepared by Arthur Young Consultancy for the Bureau for Private Enterprises, USAID,
February, 1988, 163 p.
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This report outlines the administrative and control procedures for setting up a local currency
credit guarantee fund in Guatemala. Elements relating to maintaining an efficient minimum
staffadministrative structure, costs ofoperation, guidelines for guarantee claim mechanisms,
keeping the guarantee program within the private sector and legal and financial regulatory
frameworks are discussed in detail. [7364]
Key: Small and medium enterprises, Guatemala, Local currency, USAID guarantee,
Guarantee claim, Private sector, Regulatory framework.
57. Levitsky, Jacob, "Credit Guarantees for Small Business Borrowers," What's New: An
Independent Voice for NGO News and Views, Washington, D.C., 1995, pp. 5-6.
The paper, based on reviews of several guarantee programs in operation in the Philippines,
Korea, Thailand, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Costa Rica, suggests that credit guarantee
programs are set up to reimburse lenders for loan losses incurred in servicing risky clients.
Although the aim of the guarantee programs is to encourage commercial bank lending to
small businesses with viable projects, they are unable to reach it. Guarantee schemes can be
an option to increase financing to small businesses but careful design and planning are
recommended in their implementation. Mutual guarantee schemes in operation in several
European countries and use of solidarity groups in Latin America are suggested as
alternatives to credit guarantees. [7407]
Key: Small business, Latin America, Solidarity groups, Mutual guarantee schemes,
Europe, Philippines, Korea, Thailand, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Costa Rica.
58. Levitsky, Jacob, "Best Practices in Credit Guarantee Schemes," Paper Presented at the
Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for Latin
America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-
28,1996.
The best practices in establishing a credit guarantee program are discussed based on evidence
from several developing countries. Guarantor relationship with banks and SMEs, guarantee
costs, guarantee coverage, premiums to be charged, leverage ratio, risk sharing methods and
management aspects are discussed. The guarantee schemes found in Egypt and Sri Lanka are
also illustrated. The paper concludes that guarantee funds are not a panacea to solve financial
market inefficiencies, and the effectiveness of guarantee schemes is yet to be proven. [7345]
Key: Best practice, SMEs, Guarantee coverage, Premiums, Costs, Leverage, Sri Lanka,
Egypt.
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59. Levitsky, Jacob and Ranga N. Prasad, "Credit Guarantee Schemes for Small and Medium
Enterprises," Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Technical Paper No. 58, 1987, 91p.
The paper provides information on a variety of credit guarantee schemes in developed and
developing countries. Some of the schemes have been in operation for 40 to 50 years while
some have been recently introduced. The essential elements, scope, variety and the problems
faced in the operation of guarantee schemes are discussed. A comprehensive review of the
issues involved in the design and implementation of credit guarantee schemes, based on
experiences accumulated in North America, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and Africa is
included. The paper concludes that it has been difficult to show additionality in lending since
the proportion of bank loans under guarantees in all countries has been small. Active
participation by commercial banks, viable projects, realistic fees and guarantee coverage are
suggested for implementing successful guarantee schemes. [0328]
Key: United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, United
Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Cameroon, Ghana, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Barbados,
Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, Small and medium enterprises, Additionality.
60. Levitsky, Jacob, "Credit Guarantee Funds and Mutual Guarantee Schemes," Small Enterprise
Development, Vol. 4, No.2, June 1993, pp. 4-15.
This paper describes several successful guarantee schemes in Japan, France, Italy and other
European countries to derive factors that helped their success. These programs are
characterized by decentralized operation at the guarantor level, risk coverage ranging from
70-100 percent, reduced administrative costs to the lenders while still ensuring the
willingness of the borrowers to repay loans. Mutual guarantee schemes in operation in
Germany, France and Italy that involve a mutual credit association and a counter guarantor
is recommended for developing countries. Replication of mutual credit guarantee programs
in developing countries should be made with caution since experiments in Kenya and
Senegal failed. The self-help promoted by these associations is nonetheless suggested to be
more valuable in developing countries compared to reliance on government and donor
support. [6039]
Key: France, Italy, Germany, Kenya, Senegal, The Philippines, Mutual Credit
Associations, Credit Guarantee Schemes, Guarantee Coverage.
61. Leyba, Por Carlos, "Organizacion y Gestion de los Sistemas de Garatia," Paper Presented
at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for
Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.,
June 27-28, 1996, 25 p, (Spanish).
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The paper examines the organizational and management challenges of public and private
credit guarantee schemes found in several countries including Latin America, Japan, Unites
States and Canada. It suggests that the strong private guarantee systems like mutual guaran-
tees and successful public credit guarantee systems are the result of strong credit markets.
[7483]
Key: Credit Guarantee, Organization of Guarantee, Public Guarantees, Mutual Credit
Guarantee, Latin America, Europe, Japan.
62. Llanto, Gilbert M. and Magdalena S. Casuga, "The Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund:
Credit Guarantee as Collateral Substitute, A Case Study," Manila: Agricultural Credit Policy
Council, Staff Working Paper No. 92-04, February 1992, 48 p.
Using a case study of a participating bank and its clients, this paper documents the problems
in accepting the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund guarantee as a collateral substitute.
The guarantee program provides 85 percent guarantee coverage towards loan losses incurred
in loans made for production ofagricultural crops, livestock and aquaculture against all types
of risks. It is found that the guarantees do not function strictly as a collateral substitute. The
information network and marketing assistance along with the guarantees-is considered as an
acceptable collateral substitute. Institution building, careful monitoring and evaluation, and
perfecting regulatory issues concerning loan collection and payment of guarantee claims are
recommended. [5962]
Key: Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund, Government guarantee, Evaluation,
Collateral substitute, Philippines, Agriculture, Aquaculture.
63. Llanto, Gilbert and Marife T. Magno, "An Evaluation of the Impact of the Comprehensive
Agricultural Loan Fund Credit Guarantee," Manila: Philippine Institute for Development
Studies, July 1994, 49 p.
This report assesses the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) that is constituted
as a credit guarantee fund to reimburse banks up to 85 percent of the outstanding small
fanner agricultural loans. While the program has benefitted several individuals, directly or
indirectly, the transaction costs of the guaranteed borrowers have increased and access to
formal credit still remains a problem for small fanners. The study concludes that CALF does
not provide additional advantage to the cooperatives or individuals covered under the
program, and that private banks are not enthusiastic to provide loans to small borrowers even
with the guarantee. Collateral is still required with the guarantee. The study recommends that
the guarantees should be extended only to private and not public banks, that the guarantees
to traders and millers should be discontinued since they already have good access to formal
loans, and that several of the fragmented guarantee programs be consolidated. [7403]
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Key: Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund, Government guarantee, Evaluation,
Collateral, Philippines, Agriculture, Aquaculture, Transaction costs.
64. London Business School, "International Workshop on Commercial Bank Lending for Small
Enterprises and Operation ofCredit Guarantee Schemes," London: London Business School,
Summary of International Workshop held in July 15-17, 1986, 53 p. ",
A summary of discussions held in the conference and list of participants is provided in this
report. The participants concluded that the volume of lending to small and medium
enterprises need to be increased and some level of subsidization might be healthy to attract
participation by commercial banks. A risk sharing arrangement such as credit guarantee
schemes was suggested as an attractive incentive to persuade commercial banks to lend to
small and microenterprises. [7365]
Key: Small and medium enterprises, Subsidy, Credit guarantee schemes.
65. Llorens, Juan Luis, "Loan Guarantee Systems for SMEs in Europe," Paper Presented at the
Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for Latin
America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-
28,1996.
Mutual guarantee schemes and public guarantee schemes through guarantee funds in Europe
are examined in this paper. The design, performance, costs and legal framework of mutual
guarantee schemes in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are
discussed in detail. It is concluded that guarantee programs can only be recommended when
banks ration credit due to insufficient collateral. The soundness of the scheme is found to
depend on the perceived benefits and costs of the program to the borrower, banks and the
guarantor. A second level guarantee for the mutual guarantee programs is recommended.
[7348]
Key: Mutual guarantee scheme, Public guarantee scheme, Design, Performance, Costs,
Legal framework, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
66. Magno, Marife T. and Richard L. Meyer, "Guarantee Schemes: An Alternative to the
Supervised Credit Program," Manila: Philippine Institute of Development Studies, Paper
presented at the meeting "Financial Intermediation in the Rural Sector: Research Results and
Policy Issues" held in September 26-27, 1988, 64 p.
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The conceptual model shows that additional loans will be made to risky borrowers with
guarantees since it reduces marginal costs to lending. However, it argues that if the lenders'
face liquidity constraints, guarantees will have no effect unless they reduce the marginal
costs such that costs of servicing less risky borrowers is higher than costs of servicing risky
ones with guarantees. The paper then examines four existing government guarantee programs
in the Philippines: the guarantee fund for small and medium enterprises, the industrial
guarantee and loan fund, the Quedan guarantee program, and the crop insurance program.
The analysis shows that the programs have not significantly improved the amount of credit
to agriculture, have not succeeded in encouraging banks to lend their own funds to
agriculture and have not effectively reduced the cost of lending. Except for the crop
insurance program, the other three programs seems to be designed for large borrowers. The
paper suggests that increased borrower and lender participation can only be induced through
reduction in costs. _[0189]
Key: The Philippines, Government guarantee, Agriculture, Small and medium
enterprises, Impact, Costs of lending, Liquidity.
67. Management Systems International, "Thai Danu Bank Ltd.: IFI Loan Case Study,"
Washington, D.C.: MSI, Report prepared for the Office of Program Review, Bureau of
Private Enterprise, USAID, Pre-Project No. 940-0002.48, 1988, 141 p.
The objective of this report is to evaluate and disseminate lessons learnt about the guarantee
facility established by USAID for the Thai Danu Bank in Thailand to supply loans to small
rural farms. The quality of the loan portfolio under guarantees was good and there were no
defaults. Loans under the guarantee facility resulted in significant increases in production and
employment of the borrowers. The additionality due to the program was judged to be high.
The use of guarantees rather than a direct loan to the bank was considered as an appropriate
mechanism to increase bank lending to small farmers. [7377]
Key: Thailand, Agriculture, USAID guarantee, Impact.
68. Management Systems International, "Case Study of Impact on Sub-Borrower Enterprises in
Two PRE Projects, Philippines," Washington, D.C.: MSI, Report prepared for the Office of
Program Review, Bureau of Private Enterprise, USAID, Pre-Project No. 940-0002.59,
February 1990,32 p.
This case study evaluates the impact of guaranteed bank loans to small and medium
entrepreneurs in the Philippines. Bank and borrower records, and borrower interviews were
used for the evaluation. The banks expanded their loans to small and medium enterprises and
default rates under the program were low. Average net income, employment, foreign
exchange earnings of the borrowers were found to have increased. Given the difficulties in
26
measuring the impact from the demand side, it is recommended to focus less on conducting
impact studies but more on lenders' response to financial market interventions. [7396]
Key: USAID Guarantee, Small and medium enterprises, Impact, The Philippines.
69. Management Systems International, "Far East Bank and Trust: IFI Loan Case Study,"
Washington, D.C.: MSI, Report prepared for the Office of Program Review, Bureau of
Private Enterprise, USAID, Pre-Project No. 940-0002.49, March 1988, 101 p.
The USAID program had institutional impact on the participating bank since it was able to
supply loans to small and medium businesses. There was a demonstration effect since non-
participating banks in the guarantee program started showing interest in the targeted
clientele. A review of borrower files showed that the program has contributed to export
activity during the time of economic difficulty in the Philippines. Several borrowers
graduated to access non-guaranteed loans in subsequent years. The program was rated as a
success. [7395]
Key: USAID Guarantee, The Philippines, Small and medium enterprises, Impact.
70. Management Systems International, "IFI Loan Case Study," Washington, D.C.: MSI, Report
prepared for the Office of Program Review, Bureau of Private Enterprise, USAID, Pre-
Project No. 940-0002.36, March 1988, 115 p.
An evaluation ofthe effectiveness ofthe guarantee facility established by USAID in Ecuador
is presented in this report. The guarantee is provided to banks that lend to small and medium
enterprises. Project officers, lenders and borrowers were interviewed for the study. The
guarantee fund was underutilized due to inadequate loan promotion by the banks, high
collateral requirements, and changes in economic conditions after the program was
implemented. Careful monitoring and faster responses to changing conditions are suggested
to ensure greater program success. [7388]
Key: Ecuador, USAID guarantee, Small and medium enterprises.
71. Management Systems International, "Micro-Lending Guarantee Fund: ACCION
International, Latin America," Washington, D.C.: Management Systems International,
Report Prepared for the Office of Investment, Bureau of Private Enterprise, USAID, Project
Number 940-0002.44, 1990, 113 p.
The purpose of this evaluation report is to learn lessons from the USAID initiated revolving
fund project that guarantees loans made by commercial banks to participating ACCION
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Affiliates who serve small and microentreprenuers in Mexico and Paraguay. The impact of
the guarantee scheme was more significant on participating institutions than on borrowers.
Modification of standard banking practices to increase services to microentreprenuers,
adding savings component in microlending programs and charging fees and interest fees to
cover costs are recommended. [7368]
Key: USAID Guarantee, Mexico, Paraguay, ACCION Affiliates, Impact, Small and
microenterprises.
72. Management Systems International, "Lessons from Experience: The Uses and Limitations
ofProjects in Improving Capital Markets for Small Businesses, Volume III," Washington,
D.C.: Management Systems International, Report prepared for Office of Development
Planning, USAID, June 1989, 68 p.
This report summarizes the lessons learnt from the financial projects implemented by the
Bureau of Private Enterprise of the USAID in several developing countries. The financial
projects included direct loans to small and medium enterprise, direct loans to financial
intermediaries and loan guarantee facilities. Seven loan guarantee programs implemented in
Morocco, Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico and
Paraguay are discussed. The projects were found to be generally small in relation to the
economies in the host countries. The impact ofthe projects was significant at the institutional
level in terms of their lending to small and medium enterprises without subsidies rather than
at the borrower level in terms of employment and incomes. The careful accounting of loans
made using the guarantees is recommended to evaluate the impact ofthe guarantee programs.
[7414]
Key: USAID guarantee, Morocco, Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Mexico and Paraguay, Small and medium enterprises, Impact.
73. Management Systems International, "Banco de Desarrollo Finade, IFI Loan Case Study,"
Washington, D.C.: MSI, Report prepared for the Office of Program Review, Bureau of
Private Enterprise, USAID, Pre-Project No. 940-0002.25, 1988, 66 p.
This is an evaluation report of USAID's revolving fund in Dominican Republic that
functioned as a guarantee fund to increase bank loans to private enterprises. The fund was
found to enhance a producer's export capability and generate substantial employment. The
success of the program was attributed to the local intermediary who manages the guarantee
facility. The program was later terminated due to illiquidity in the banking sector. [7381]
Key: Dominican Republic, USAID guarantee, Liquidity, Private enterprises, Impact.
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74. Management Systems International, "Strategic Assessment of the Availability of
Commercial Financing for Small and Medium Scale Enterprises in Botswana and Evaluation
of the Bureau for Private Enterprise's Loan Guarantee Facility," Washington, D.C.: MSI,
Report Prepared for USAID/Botswana, November 1990, 81 p.
This paper reports on an evaluation of the USAID guarantee program implemented in
Botswana in 1988 to provide loans to small and medium enterprises by strengthening the
capabilities of the commercial banks to expand their lending to the sector. The study shows
that there was limited awareness of the use of the guarantee facility among the participants
and the utilization rate has been very low. An evaluation of20 borrowers ofwhich 50 percent
were guaranteed borrowers showed that although guaranteed borrowers achieved a marked
increase in their sales, a relatively small amount of additional employment was created. It
was concluded that it is unlikely that the project activity will be sustained after the
withdrawal of USAID support. Recommendation was made to streamline the reporting
requirements by the banks on sub-borrower information for careful future evaluation of the
program. [7372]
Key: Botswana, Impact, Small and medium enterprises, USAID guarantee,
Sustainability.
75. Mandel, Alan, S., "SBA Guaranteed Loans," Economic Development Commentary, Vol. 17,
No.3, 1993, pp. 20-25.
This paper reports on the Price Waterhouse study that evaluated the U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA) guaranteed loans. The SBA loan recipients were much newer into
small businesses, and grew more rapidly in revenues, sales, employment and taxes compared
to the control group. Several loan recipients also graduated in their ability to obtain
unguaranteed loans from the banks. The author concludes that SBA loan guarantee program
is a useful tool for economic development.
Key: Small businesses, Impact, USA, Small Business Administration.
76. McKean, Cressida, "Experience with Guarantee Authorities: A Brief Overview of the
Issues," Washington, D.C.: USAID, Center for Development Information and Evaluation,
Working PaperNo. 185, October 1994,8 p.
This paper discusses key issues arising from evaluations and reviews of guarantee programs
implemented by several donors and governments to derive implications for the expansion
of the USAID's guarantee facility. Designing, implementing and monitoring guarantee
programs involved considerable human resources and finding cooperative bankers was
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difficult. Technical assistance and training for the bankers were required to ensure the long
term effect of the guarantee program. [7393]
Key: USAID guarantee, Small and microenterprises.
77. Merton, Robert C. and Zvi Bodie, "On the Management ofFinancial Guarantees," Financial
Mana~ement, Winter 1992, pp. 81-109.
The analysis provided in this paper is relevant to the evaluation ofcontracts with explicit and
implicit guarantees. Methods used by guarantors to manage and control the cost ofproviding
guarantees are discussed. The cases of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) are presented to derive
implications for government supported guarantee programs. [7389]
Key: Government guarantee, FDIC, FSLIC, USA, Costs of Guarantees.
78. Meyer, Richard L. and Geetha Nagarajan, "Credit Guarantee Schemes for Developing
Countries: Theory, Design and Evaluation," Columbus: Department of Agricultural
Economics and Rural Sociology, Report Prepared for the Africa Bureau of
USAID/Washington, Barents Group LLC, May 1996,92 p.
This report discusses the key issues concerning the theory, design and evaluation of credit
guarantee schemes implemented to increase bank lending to small, medium and
microenterprises and agriculture sector in developing countries. Programs in Africa are
described and schemes found in Asia and Latin America are discussed to derive implications
for Sub Saharan Africa. The paper concludes that the impact of several credit guarantee
schemes in developing countries is minimal but rigorous evaluation techniques are required
to better examine the impact of credit guarantee schemes. [7419]
Key: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, Impact, Design of guarantee programs,
Small, medium and micro enterprises, Agriculture.
79. Meyer, Richard L. and Geetha Nagarajan, "Import Substitution and Export Promotion:
Prospects for the Horticultural and Poultry Subsectors in Swaziland," Columbus: Department
of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, ESO No. 2192,
December 1994,46 p.
To increase the flow of formal credit to risky sectors including exporters and small
businesses, the Government of Swaziland established in the Central Bank the Small-Scale
Enterprise Loan Guarantee Scheme and the Export Finance Loan Guarantee Scheme. There
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appears to be little additionality due to these schemes in terms of an increased number of
loans made or larger sized loans made to risky enterprises. Although the actual defaults on
loans guaranteed through these schemes have been reported to be low, large provisions have
been made for future losses. The commercial banks are reluctant to utilize the guarantee
facilities because they can obtain 100 percent collateral from their borrowers compared to
only a 75-85 percent coverage from the guarantees, and because the settlement of claims has
involved tedious and expensive procedures. [7002]
Key: Government guarantee, Small enterprises, Export guarantee, Swaziland,
Collateral.
80. Meyer, Richard L., and Geetha Nagarajan, "Comments on Gudger's Paper on Sustainability
of Credit Guarantee Systems," Paper Presented at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee
Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-
American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-28, 1996, 3 p.
This discussion paper reflects the reactions to the paper presented by Gudger on
sustainability of credit guarantee systems at the IDB Round Table conference. Factors
responsible for sustainability, governance issues, and relationship between sustainability and
additionality are recommended to be considered in examining sustainability of guarantee
programs. It is suggested that programs that provide larger benefits to winners than losers
can be cost effective. [7349]
Key: Sustainability, Additionality, Costs, SMEs, Developing countries.
81. Meyer, Richard L., and Geetha Nagarajan, "Evaluating Credit Guarantee Programs in
Developing Countries," Columbus: The Ohio State University, Department of Agricultural
Economics and Rural Sociology, ESO No. 2322, June 1996, 14 p.
The paper discusses the key issues involved in evaluating credit guarantee programs for
agricultural and small enterprise lending in developing countries. A review of the results of
evaluations shows that there is little quantitative information to clearly support the use of
guarantee programs to stimulate lending in developing countries.
Key: Evaluation, Developing countries, SMEs.
82. Ministry of Trade and Industry of South Africa and The World Bank, "Establishing a
Financial Apex for Emerging Enterprises in South Africa," Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank, March 1995,94 p.
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A guarantee scheme to guarantee and refinance small, medium and microenterprise portfolio
loans made by banks in South Africa is proposed in this paper. The scheme is to be funded
and managed outside the financial apex set up to improve access to financial services by
emerging enterprises. A portfolio approach and a tiered guarantee structure where the
guarantee coverage is commensurate with the riskiness of the portfolio are recommended.
[7379]
Key: Financial Apex, Emerging enterprises, South Africa, Government guarantee,
Small, medium and microenterprises, Portfolio approach, Tiered guarantee structure.
83. Ministry of Trade and Industry of South Africa and The World Bank, "Framework for
Providing Financial Services to Emerging Enterprises in South Africa," Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank, Paper Presented at the Workshop on Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise
Development and Financing, November 11, 1994, 27 p.
This paper proposes a financial services apex facility that provides refinancing, capitaliza-
tion, guarantees, institutional development funds and technical assistance to banks, NGOs,
development corporations to broaden access to financial services by emerging small, medium
and microentreprenuers. The impact of guarantee schemes operated by the Small Business
Development Corporation (SBDC) and USAID on expanding access to emerging entrepre-
neurs to bank loans has been limited. Careful examination of the schemes is recommended
before expanding the current or implementing new guarantee programs. [7387]
Key: USAID guarantee, Government guarantee, Small, medium and micro enterprises,
South Africa, Financial Apex, Emerging enterprises.
84. Mody, Ashoka and Dilip K. Patro, "Valuing and Accounting for Loan Guarantees," The
World Bank Research Observer, No.1, Vol. 11, Feb. 1996, pp. 119-142.
The authors review several methods used for valuation of government guarantees, and on
methods of accounting designed to anticipate losses and create reserves to ensure that the
costs of guarantees are transparent. Governments are recommended to establish strict
accounting, valuation and risk sharing mechanisms to minimize guarantee costs. [7355]
Key: Value of guarantees, Risk sharing, Guarantee costs.
85. Moore, B.J. and G.A. Schoombee, "Bank Credit to the Informal Sector: Challenge and
Reward," Development Southern Africa, Vol. 12, No.3, June 1995, pp. 347-360.
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The authors examine the constraints and potential in servicing the informal sector in South
Africa. There is a lack of link between formal banks and informal sector but several
innovations such as community development banking that bring banks closer to its clients
and group lending have been developed to address the problem. The authors suggest that a
microloan guarantee fund, financed in part by a government subsidy and in part by the loss
related fee on banks, that covers stipulated portion ofthe losses incurred on microloans made
by banks can encourage more loans to the informal sector. [7194]
Key: South Africa, Microloan guarantee fund, Informal sector.
86. Nelson, C.H. and Loehmal, "Further Toward a Theory ofAgricultural Insurance," American
Journal of A~riculturalEconomics, 1987, pp. 523-531.
The economic theory ofcontracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that, given full
information, Pareto-optimal insurance contracts are actuarially fair, provide full coverage,
and differ for each individual. The information problems of moral hazard and adverse
selection prevent Pareto optimality from being attained. Several second-best solutions to
these problems are applied to agricultural insurance. It is shown that information collection
and the application of contract design principles are second-best solutions which may
achieve the benefits of insurance at a lower cost than the current practice ofpublic subsidies.
Key: Agriculture, Insurance, Moral hazard, Adverse selection.
87. Njoku, J.E. and P.C. Obasi, "Loan Repayment and its Determinants Under the Agricultural
Credit Guarantee Scheme in Imo State, Nigeria," Savin~s and Development, Vol. 2, 1991,
pp. 167-180.
The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme implemented in 1977 in Nigeria to facilitate small
farmers' access to bank loans to stimulate agricultural production is examined in this paper.
Although there has been an increase in financing to the agricultural sector, the overall impact
of the program has been minimal. Default rate was high and the poor repayment rate on
guaranteed loans was attributed to low output and profitability of the enterprises funded. The
screening of borrowers placed under guarantees was lax and monitoring was minimal. The
loans were disbursed untimely and little effort was exerted to collect on the loans. It is
recommended that the program improve its repayment rates for sustainability. [5026]
Key: Nigeria, Agriculture, Government guarantee, Loan repayment.
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88. Oehring, Eckart, "Credit Guarantee Scheme for the Small Business Sector," Switzerland:
FUNDES, Paper Presented at the Conference Creating Local Guarantee Funds in Poland held
in Warschua, Poland, March 22,1994,27 p.
This is an interim assessment ofFUNDES guarantee program after eight years of operation
in Latin America. The countries include Panama, Cost Rica, Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia
and Chile. FUNDES program provides management training and business consultancy in
addition to credit guarantees to small entrepreneurs. Considering the default and capital loss,
the guarantee scheme is considered a success. However, it has been observed that banks do
not consider FUNDES guarantee very attractive. A shift from a selective to a global approach
in guaranteeing loans in a target sector is suggested to increase the coverage of the program.
[7416]
Key: FUNDES guarantee, Small and microenterprises, Panama, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Selective approach, Global approach.
89. Oehring, Eckart, "Experience with Loan Guarantee Funds for Promotion of Small
Enterprises in Latin America," United Nations, New York: Savin~s and Credit for
Development, Report of the International Conference on Savings and Credit for
Development held in Klarskovgard, Denmark, May 28-31, 1990, pp. 250-265.
Notes the loan guarantee schemes exist in almost all of the industrialized countries,
originating in the solidarity and self-help tradition of guilds and cooperatives. The results
obtained in transplanting similar schemes to third world countries, using external financing,
have generally been negative. Argues that credit guarantee schemes can be useful
instruments for promoting small enterprise development, but that the precise aims of the
funds and the firms to be targeted, and the manner in which they are administered must be
clear and in accordance with market economics. Describes the experiences of FUNDES, a
development program organized by private business in Switzerland, in implementing credit
guarantee programs in Latin America.
Key: FUNDES guarantee, Latin America, Small enterprises.
90. Oehring, Eckart, "Credit Guarantee Scheme for the Small Business Sector," New
Perspectives on Financin~ Small Business in Developin~ Countries, Ernst A. Brugger and
Sarath Rajapatirana, eds., California: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1995, pp.
123-146.
The rationale for credit guarantee schemes based on high costs of microloans, lack of
collateral among microentreprenuers and lack of financial technologies among banks to pro-
vide small loans is examined. The credit guarantee programs established by FUNDES in six
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Latin American countries ofPanama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia and Chile
are described. FUNDES follows a selective guarantee program where individual loan appli-
cations are examined and referred to the banks for loans. The applications are backed up with
a 50 percent FUNDES guarantee on borrower's deficient payments. As of 1992, FUNDES
has guaranteed more than 2,200 small entrepreneurs in Latin America and the default rate,
after six years of operation, has been low. The costs per dollar guaranteed was observed to
decline with an increase in volume of loans guaranteed. The paper concludes that FUNDES
program has been effective but needs to switch to a global approach wherein all loans made
to a target sector are eligible for FUNDES guarantee in order to increase the program cover-
age. An increase in percentage of FUNDES guarantee and reduction in premiums are also
suggested to induce banks and low-risk borrowers in a sector to apply for a guarantee. [7402]
Key: FUNDES guarantee, Small and microenterprises, Panama, Costa Rica,
Guatemala, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Selective approach, Global approach.
91. Oehring, Eckart, "Experiencias Del Sistema de Garantias en America Latina FUNDES:
Modelo, Resultados y Perspectivas," Paper Presented at the Round Table on Credit
Guarantee Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for Latin America and the
Caribbean, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-28,1996,16 p,
(Spanish).
The performance of guarantee programs by Fundes in several Latin American countries are
discussed in terms oftheir additionality, costs and fees. The program is based on a selective
approach where the guarantor evaluates and monitors every applicant for the guarantee. The
bankers were not enthusiastic about the program and the guaranteed loans incurred high
defaults. A mutual guarantee scheme is suggested as an alternative model. [7482]
Key: FUNDES, Latin America, Additionality, Fees, Costs, Mutual guarantee.
92. Painter, Flora, "Review of ACCION International Affiliates in Chile, Paraguay, and Costa
Rica," Washington, D.C.: Coopers and Lybrand, Report prepared for the Office of
Investment, Bureau of Private Enterprise, USAID, Project Number 940-2002, September
1991,70p.
This report evaluates the impact of the USAID guarantee facility on local affiliates of
ACCION International in Chile, Paraguay and Costa Rica. The guarantee facility has enabled
the affiliates to borrow from the local banks. No causal relationships were found between
guaranteed loans and borrower's sales, income and employment. A combination of credit,
training and technical assistance is suggested for realizing a positive impact of the guarantees
at the borrower level. [7376]
35
Key: USAID Guarantee, Impact, Chile, Paraguay, Costa Rica, ACCION International,
Small and microenterprises.
93. Palmer, E., "The Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme," The Development ofNi~erian
Agriculture: Suggestions for the Future, Adeniyi Osuntogun, Philippe Chasse and Rex
Ugorji, eds., Nigeria: Evansbros Publishers Ltd, 1980, pp. 143-146.
The policy, administrative and financial guidelines of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee
Scheme Fund established in Nigeria to increase bank lending to small farmers are reviewed
in this paper. The key problems facing the scheme such as rising defaults, inadequate
evaluation of projects by banks and loan diversification by borrowers are also examined.
Cooperation between banks and extension services and linkages with cooperative societies
are suggested to improve the impact of the guarantee scheme. [7417]
Key: Nigeria, Agriculture, Small farmers, Impact, Government guarantee.
94. Pathak, K.B., "Credit Guarantee Schemes for Small Scale Industries: Some Operational
Problems of Banks," State Bank of India Monthly Review, January 1990, pp. 14-26.
The credit guarantee scheme operated by the deposit insurance and credit guarantee
corporation since 1981 in India to increase bank loans made to small scale industries is
described in this paper. High guarantee fee and low coverage discouraged banks from
participating in the program. Mandatory requirements to lend to small scale industries has
also reduced voluntary participation by banks in the guarantee program. [6388]
Key: Government guarantee, India, Small scale industries, Guarantee fee and coverage.
95. Pomareda, Carlos, Financial and Mana~ement ofA~riculturalDevelopment Banks, Boulder:
Westview Press, Replica Editions, 1984, 180 p.
The book analyzes the impact ofvarious policies that reduce risks of lending on the growth
of agricultural development banks. The policies include credit insurance, reduction of
subsidies and increase in interest rates. Credit insurance is observed to produce benefits to
agricultural development banks that issue a large number of loans. But the author cautions
that the results cannot be generalized to other banks.
Key: Insurance, Development banks, Subsidy, Agriculture.
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96. Prabhu, K. Setta, "Crop-Credit Insurance: Some Disturbing Features," Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 21, 1986, pp. 1866-1869.
Author describes a new crop insurance scheme introduced in India in 1985. A major reason
for introducing the program was to increase the chances of some farmers getting formal
loans. The program is restricted to borrowers of formal loans who grow major crops. The
author is particularly concerned about setting the premium rates and the degree of
subsidization of these rates for various classes of rural borrowers. [0108]
Key: Agriculture, Insurance, India.
97. Price Waterhouse, "Evaluation of the Small Business Administration's 7(a) Guaranteed
Business Loan Program," Washington, D.C.: Price Waterhouse, Report prepared for the U.S.
Small Business Administration, March 1992, 47 p.
The Small Business Administration 7(a) guaranteed business loan program in the U.S.
designed to promote small business formation and growth by guaranteeing long-term loans
to qualified small businesses is evaluated in this report. Conclusions were drawn based on
a survey of representative sample businesses that received guaranteed loans and a control
sample that was similar in terms of size and industry but had never received a guaranteed
loan. The firms that received guaranteed loans were newer to business than the comparison
group. Guaranteed loans were used for financing start-up costs compared to commercial
loans that were used by the comparison group to expand the business. Guarantees facilitated
the borrowers to receive loans with favorable terms. The firms that received guaranteed loans
grew significantly more in terms of sales and revenues than the comparison group, and had
a positive opinion of the program. [7366]
Key: Government guarantee, Small business, USA, Impact.
98. Quedancor, "Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation," Manila: Quedancor, Report
prepared for the Philippines 2000, 1994, 28 p.
This collection of brochures describes the several loan guarantee programs and guaranteed
co-financing programs in operation in the Philippines. The objectives, eligibility criteria,
terms and conditions, guarantee coverage and fees are described for each of the guarantee
programs. The guarantee programs target the sectors of agriculture, small and medium
enterprises and aquaculture. [7362]
Key: Government guarantee, The Philippines, Small and medium enterprises,
Agriculture, Aquaculture.
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99. Reddy, Sarath K., "Institutions for Sustainable Development: The Case of Agricultural
Marketing Foundation and Agricultural Marketing Loan Guarantee Fund: Guinea - Lessons
Learned," Guinea: USAID, May 1995, 11 p.
The experiences of the agricultural marketing loan guarantee fund established by USAID in
Guinea are discussed in this paper. Commitment of ultimate beneficiaries in terms of time
and money, sustained commitment of bank officials, flexible design, and fees to cover for
costs and claims are recommended as measures to attain sustainability.
Key: Guinea, Agriculture, USAID Guarantee, Sustainability.
100. The Republic of Slovania Fund for Small Business Development, "Annual Report, 1996,"
Ljubljana, Stefanova: The Republic of Slovania Fund for Small Business Development,
1996,53 p.
The guarantee fund was started in 1992 to increase access to bank loans for small businesses
that employ 50-120 employees in manufacturing and services sector. The operation design,
volume and number of guarantees issued since 1992, costs of servicing the guarantees,
default rates and premium incomes are reported. Default rate is reported to be around 30
percent of the total outstanding guarantees. [7385]
Key: Slovakia, Small business, Costs, Premiums, Default.
101. RG Blaney Urban Systems Inc., "The Credit Guarantee Company (CGC): Egypt,"
Washington, D.C.: RG Blaney Urban Systems Inc., October 1994,8 p.
This paper describes the organizational structure and performance of the Credit Guarantee
Company in Egypt established by USAID to increase bank lending to small and medium
scale enterprises and newly established medical practitioners. The design of the guarantee
facility is found to be ideal and the company is considered as a credible guarantor. The banks
have been enthusiastic in using the guarantee facility to lend to the targeted clientele. The
claim rates have been low and the fund is viable. Training and technical assistance by donors
is recommended. [7391]
Key: Credit Guarantee Company, Egypt, USAID guarantee, Small and medium
enterprises.
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102. Rhyne, Elizabeth, H., Small Business, Banks, and SBA Loan Guarantees: Subsidizin~ the
Weak or Brid~in~ a Credit Gap?, New York: Quorum Books, 1988, 178 p.
The credit guarantee program administered by the Small Business Administration (SBA) in
the u.S. is evaluated in this book. The interplay between political and economic goals and
performance standards, relationship between default rates and subsidy paid by the
government, and the program's ultimate purposes are discussed in detail. Lending through
certified and preferred lenders using reduced guarantee coverage and appropriate guarantee
fee are recommended for SBA in order to reduce defaults and attain viability.
Key: Small Business Administration, Evaluation, Subsidy cost, Defaults, Guarantee
coverage and fees, Government guarantee, USA.
103. Riding, Alan, L., "On the Care and Nurture ofLoan Guarantee Programs," Ottawa: Carleton
University, School of Business, 1996, 45 p.
A theoretical rationale for loan guarantees is provided and the Canadian loan guarantee
program (SBLA) is examined in this paper. The issues ofprogram design are discussed using
the principal-agent framework. The SBLA is reported to incur low administration costs, to
experience low default rates and to have increased access to bank loans for SMEs. There
were economic incentives for lenders but a small subsidization of riskier firms was noticed.
A rigorous analysis of social welfare cost and benefits of the program is recommended.
[7354]
Key: Principal-agent, Canada, Costs, Benefits, Subsidy, Defaults, Program design.
104. Riding, A.L., "Comments on R.C. Vogel and D.W Adams, "Costs and Benefits of Loan
Guarantee Programs"," Discussion Paper Presented at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee
Systems: International Experiences and Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-
American Development Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-28,1996,6 p.
The author primarily comments on the paper presented at the IDB Round Table conference
by Vogel and Adams on the rationale ofcredit guarantee programs, and secondarily provides
information on the costs and benefits of the Canadian loan guarantee program, SBLA. The
SBLA is reported to be currently operating with no subsidy from the government, to be
benefiting the lenders, and to charge premiums high enough to promote additionality without
adverse selection. [7485]
Key: Canada, Costs, Benefits, Additionality, Subsidy, Market inefficiency.
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105. Schuett, von Friedrich H., "The German System of Credit Guarantee Companies to Promote
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises," Hamburg: German Guarantee Association,
September 1995, 4 p.
The author describes the operational methods of Burgschaftsbanken, a national system of
Credit Guarantee Companies, that provide credit guarantees to small and medium sized
enterprises and independent professionals. The credit guarantee companies cover 80 percent
of the losses on loans made to small and medium businesses. The guarantee companies are
counter guaranteed free of charge by federal and state governments for 65 percent of the
losses made on small and medium business portfolio. The guarantee losses during their 40
year existence have been reported to be three to four percent of the total amount guaranteed.
The companies are now guaranteeing leasing contracts and venture capital deals. The author
concludes that the future of these companies is promising. [7408]
Key: Germany, Credit Guarantee Company, Small and medium enterprises, Counter
guarantee.
106. Schuett, von Friedrich H., "Das Kreditgarantiesystem in der Turkei zur Forderrung kleiner
und mittlerer Untrenehmen," Hamburg: German Guarantee Association, November 1995,
2 p, (German).
This paper describes the credit guarantee program in operation in Turkey since 1991 with the
help of GTZ. The banks are guaranteed up to 80 percent of the principal loan losses. The
program currently operates on state subsidies. Ineffective monetary policies is suggested to
deter the effective functioning of the program.
Key: GTZ Guarantee, Turkey, Subsidy.
107. Seibal, Hans Dieter, "Credit Guarantee Schemes in Small and Microenterprise Finance: Do
They Really Do More Good Than Harm? - The Case ofThe Philippines," Quarterly Journal
of Intemational A{:riculture, Vol. 34, No.2, April-June 1995, pp. 171-179.
Four government guarantee schemes in operation in The Philippines to promote agriculture
and small businesses are examined in this paper. Analysis shows that these guarantee
schemes form part of social banking and are institutionally unviable. The schemes restrict
rather than encourage bank lending and offer no solution to the problems faced by small and
microenterprise finance. They seem to do more harm than good. It is recommended to leave
risk management either to banks or to small and microentreprenuers and their grassroots
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solidarity arrangements. Linking solidarity groups and banks using mutual credit guarantee
model, as promoted by GTZ in various Asian and African countries, is recommended. [7279]
Key: The Philippines, Government guarantee, Mutual Credit Guarantee, GTZ
guarantee, Small and micro enterprises, Agriculture.
108. Shared Interest, "Thembani International Guarantee Fund," New York: Shared Interest,
1996,4 p.
This pamphlet describes the guarantee program initiated by Shared Interest, an NGO of the
USA and RAFAD (Research and Applications of Alternative Financing for Development)
in Europe to increase lending to SMEs in South Africa. The funds raised by Shared Interest
and RAFAD are used as a guarantee for loans made by South African commercial banks to
community development financial institutions and NGOs that lend to small and micro
enterprises. The program started operation in 1996.
Key: South Africa, Shared Interest, RAFAD, NGOs, SMEs.
109. Sherrick, Bruce J., "A Simple Valuation Model for Loan Guarantees and a Comparison of
a State and Federal Program," Urbana: Department of Agricultural Economics, University
of Illinois, May 1993, 29 p.
Two loan guarantee programs, the Federal Home Administration that guarantees up to 90
percent of the principal and accrued interest of the loan defaulted and the Illinois Farm
Development Authority that guarantees up to 85 percent of the principal and interest after
the first 15 percent of the principal amount is realized by the lender, are evaluated. A
dynamic programming model developed to study the programs shows that the value of the
guarantee decreases as initial collateral coverage increases, but at decreasing rates.
Lengthening the term ofthe guarantee tends to improve the likelihood for firm survival but
decreases the value of the guarantees. [7401]
Key: USA, Agriculture, Valuation, Guarantee coverage.
110. Smyth, Dennis M., "Evaluation of PREll program with ACCION International,"
Washington, D.C.: Office of Investment, Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID, September
1991,90p.
This report is an evaluation of the USAID loan guarantee facility established with ACCION
International to provide loans to small and microentreprenuers in Mexico, Ecuador, Costa
Rica, Paraguay and Chile. The guarantee fund has increased access ofthe ACCION affiliates
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to bank loans and has helped establish good banking relationships between the banks and the
affiliates. The training and supervision of the affiliates by ACCION has significantly
facilitated implementation of the guarantee program. Several positive experiences and
problems faced by the affiliates in implementing the programs are documented. [7380]
Key: USAID guarantee, ACCION guarantee, Mexico, Paraguay, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Small and microenterprises, Evaluation. .
111. Stearns, Katherine, Leverage or Loss? Guarantee Funds and Microenterprises, Washington,
D.C.: ACCION International, Monograph No.8, July 1993, 100 p.
This monograph examines the potential of guarantee funds to increase financing to
microentreprenuers in developing countries. The document explores the design and
effectiveness of guarantee schemes under the individual, portfolio and intermediary models
of guarantee programs. The intermediary model used by ACCION International in Ecuador
and Colombia are described in detail and compared to several guarantee schemes in Asia and
Africa. High guarantee coverage, political pressure, irresponsible lending, poor division of
risk and responsibilities, and inexperience in lending to small and microentreprenuers are
found to contribute to failure of individual and portfolio model based' guarantee schemes.
The author shows that although there are few weaknesses with intermediary guarantee
model, it can increase financing to small and microentreprenuers compared to other models.
The intermediary model shares risk and responsibilities among the guarantors, lenders and
the borrowers, and reduces transaction costs. The intermediary's relationship with the
guarantor discourage defaults. The intermediary model also corrects for the inexperience that
contribute to low levels of utilization of the guarantee funds in other models. [7409]
Key: Individual, Portfolio and Intermediary Models of Credit Guarantee Schemes,
ACCION International, Colombia, Ecuador, Bridge Fund, Small and micro
enterprises, Transaction costs.
112. Thillairajah, Sabapathy, "Development ofRural Financial Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa,"
Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Africa Technical Department Series No. 219, 1994, 142
p.
Rural financial operations including loan guarantee schemes found in Sub-Saharan Africa
with focus on savings mobilization, improving loan portfolio management and reducing
transaction costs are synthesized in this report. Use of mutual group guarantees in Malawi
as collateral substitutes is discussed. [6050]
Key: Mutual group guarantees, Sub-Saharan Africa, Transaction costs, Collateral
substitute, Malawi.
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113. USAID, "Burundi's Financial Sector: Summary," Washington, D.C.: USAID, July 1989,5
p.
This paper provides brief information on the Fonds National de Garantie, a guarantee
institution that was started by Government ofBurundi in 1988 to provide guarantees to small
and microentreprenuers with insufficient collateral to access bank loans. The fund is set up
as a limited liability company with an ownership structure subscribed between the
Government ofBurundi and local banks. The institution assesses individual borrowers and
recommends them for bank loans with a 58 percent guarantee back up to cover for loan
losses. In 1989, the fund received 17 requests for over BuF 1.1 million (43 percent of the
total loans applied by the target sector to all banks) but there has been no guarantees issued
under this program. It is suggested that the institution requires technical assistance to
evaluate credit risks and manage risky portfolios. [7486]
Key: Burundi, Government guarantee, Small and microenterprises.
114. USAID, "Micro and Small Business Loan Portfolio Guarantee Program," Washington, D.C.:
Office of Investment, Bureau of Private Enterprise, USAID, 1995, 58 p.
The rationale, objectives and design features of the Loan Portfolio Guarantee Program
implemented by USAID in developing countries are described in this report. Data on volume
of guaranteed loans issued and claims paid as of 1993 are provided for the regions of Asia,
Africa and the Latin America. [7373]
Key: USAID Guarantee, Asia, Latin America, Africa.
115. USAID, "Design and Management of Credit Projects for Small and Medium Scale
Enterprises: Guidelines for Working with Commercial Financial Institutions," Washington:
Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID, November 1988, 56 p.
This guidebook provides a description ofthe types ofassistance, implementation designs and
lessons learnt through the private sector revolving fund established in 1983 to encourage
private enterprises to stimulate economy. The mechanisms for assistance under the fund
include direct loans and loan guarantees to intermediate financial institutions, and direct
loans to individual projects. The most important rule in design of a guarantee scheme is that
it should not cover 100 percent of the credit risk faced by a financial intermediary.
Guarantees in the range of 50-80 percent seem to be effective. USAID programs that provide
50 percent guarantee coverage have been successful. To be cost effective without
subsidization, it is suggested that guarantee programs cover a wide range of population
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within a target group so that riskier clients are cross-subsidized, and to rely on banks to do
loan appraisal. [1808]
Key: USAID guarantee, Private enterprises, Portfolio approach, Guarantee coverage,
Subsidy.
116. USAID, "Audit of the Activities of the Bahamian Agricultural Credit Guarantee Fund,"
Washington, D.C.: USAID, Audit Report No. 9-000-91-005, March 1991, 10 p.
The activities of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Fund administered by USAID in the
Commonwealth of Bahamas is evaluated in this report. The study found that the fund was
not managed and monitored well by USAID. The utilization of the fund by the banks was
low and guaranteed loans suffered high default rates. It was recommended to terminate the
guarantee facility since it did not increase the lending to the target sector. [7390]
Key: USAID Guarantee, Bahamas.
117. USAID, "South African Programme of the USAID," Johannesburg: USAID, August 1995,
10 p.
This paper briefly outlines the guarantee programs implemented by USAID to facilitate black
private sector development. It describes the private sector housing guarantee program, basic
shelter housing guarantee program and small business loan portfolio guarantee program.
[7415]
Key: South Africa, Housing loan guarantees, SMEs, USAID.
118. Villani, Kevin, "Comments on: Loan Guarantees and Crowding Out," Congressional Budget
Office, The Congress ofthe United States: Proceedings of the Conference on the Economics
of Federal Credit Activity: Part I, 1980, pp. 39-50.
The author, while commenting on a paper that shows the crowding out ofprivate investment
by federal loan guarantees, shows that federal guarantees make financial instruments
homogeneous at no cost to the government. Homogenization of financial instruments is
considered important for secondary markets since it reduces the transaction costs of trades
and improves market efficiency. The author claims that the major danger in use of guarantee
lies in its potential to subsidize the operations by setting the premium below an actuarially
sound level rather than in its crowding out effect. [7411]
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Key: Crowding out, Federal guarantee, Transaction costs, Secondary market, Subsidy,
Premium.
119. Vogel, Robert, C and Dale W Adams, "Rationale for Establishing Credit Guarantee
Systems," Paper Presented at the Round Table on Credit Guarantee Systems: International
Experiences and Lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean, Inter-American Development
Bank, Washington, D.C., June 27-28, 1996, 15 p.
The extent to which loan guarantees address financial market imperfections and the issues
in analyzing the costs and benefits of the guarantee programs are discussed. It is concluded
that the design of several schemes do not address financial market imperfections, that several
schemes involve subsidies, that evaluations of these programs do not report costs, and that
benefits of these programs are not carefully documented and additionality not measured
correctly. A careful documentation of the programs is recommended. [7351]
Key: Additionality, Market imperfections, Subsidy, Costs, Design, Benefits.
120. von Stockhausen, Joachim, "Credit Guarantee Schemes: Scope and Limitations of Credit
Guarantee Schemes for Small Farmer Development," Rome: FAO, 1987, 67p.
The author discusses the significance of credit guarantee schemes for financial markets and
public credit guarantee funds. A two-stage credit guarantee scheme and external support are
suggested.
Key: Two tier guarantee, Public guarantee.
121. von Stockhausen, Joachim, "Guarantee Funds and the Provision of Capital in the Self-Help
Sphere," Rural Financial Markets in Developin~ Countries, J.D. Von Pischke, Dale W
Adams and Gordon Donald, eds., Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp.
169-173.
The author suggests that a two-tier guarantee system, with collective guarantees by target
group members and counter guarantees by a government agency, is more effective in
promoting self-help activities than direct guarantees from public agencies. Guarantees should
be an instrument to assist self-help among marginal groups. It is recommended that the
development effects of guarantee programs are realized only when combined with measures
to promote savings and increase the creditworthiness of the target group. Free guarantees are
indirect subsidies that can destroy savings mobilization, and bad credits and low repayment
rates will destroy guarantee programs.
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Key: Two tier guarantee, Counter guarantor, Savings, Subsidy.
122. von Stockhausen, Joachim, "Credit Guarantee Schemes: A State-Of-The-Art Paper," Rome:
FAO, January 1987, 69p.
Reviews three types of credit guarantees: individual, public and collective guarantees as
external or collective provision of collateral. Public guarantee funds and their role are
discussed. A two tier guarantee mechanism which can be utilized by self-help groups to
evolve into credit guarantee associations is suggested. [3101]
Key: Two tier guarantee, Individual guarantee, Collective guarantee, Collateral.
123. von Stockhausen, Joachim, "Credit Guarantee Schemes for Small Farmers," London: Institut
fur Wirtschaftsforscung, 1988, 71 p.
Several guarantee schemes implemented in developed and developing countries are reviewed
to show that they are successful only ifthey increase borrower's credit worthiness rather than
reduce the lender's default loss. The objective of credit guarantee schemes can be defined
as encouraging financial institutions to lend to small businesses by reducing lender's risk and
information costs as well as offering managerial and technical services to form a long-term
relationship between the bank and the small clients. The author proposes a two tier credit
guarantee scheme that consists of several mutual credit associations and a counter guarantor
to stabilize the self-help potential of the mutual credit association by risk sharing. [3460]
Key: Two tier guarantee, Counter guarantor, Mutual credit associations, Small
business, Developed countries, Developing countries.
124. Williamson, Stephen, D., "Do Informational Frictions Justify Federal Credit Programs?,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Bankin~, Vol. 26, No.3, August 1994, part 2, pp. 523-551.
This paper examines the effects ofthree types of federal credit programs implemented by the
u.S. government: direct government lending, loan guarantees and secondary market for
private loans. Author suggests that if rationing exists without the loan guarantees,
implementation of the program lowers the interest margins faced by the lenders, increases
the interest rate faced by the borrowers and eventually increases the probability that a
borrower is rationed. Therefore all credit market participants are worse off with guarantees.
The paper suggests no additionality due to loan guarantee schemes. Concludes that
government loan guarantees have no effect on the quantity of lending or the interest rates,
if there is no credit rationing prior to government intervention. [7413]
Key: Rationing, USA, Government guarantee, Additionality.
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